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Abstract. Bow-tie analysis includes a graphical representation for de-
picting threats and consequences related to unwanted events, and shows
how preventive and reactive barriers can provide control over such situa-
tions. This kind of analysis has traditionally been used to elicit require-
ments for safety and reliability engineering, but as a consequence of the
ever-increasing coupling between the cyber and physical world, security
has become an additional concern. Through a controlled experiment, we
provide evidence that the expressiveness of the bow-tie notation is suit-
able for this purpose as well. Our results show that a sample population
of graduate students, inexperienced in security modelling, perform simi-
larly as security experts when we have a well-defined scope and familiar
target system/situation. We also demonstrate that misuse case diagrams
should be regarded as more of a complementary than competing mod-
elling technique.
Keywords: bow-tie analysis, requirements elicitation, controlled exper-
iment, digital exams
1 Introduction
There is an increasingly tight coupling between the cyber and physical world,
which leads to new forms of risks that have not been considered adequately,
such that the cyberelement adversely affects the physical environment [2]. This
is typically seen in industries that up until now have been running on isolated
platforms and networks, but through rapid digital transformations find them-
selves exposed to hostile cyber attacks from new categories of adversaries, as well
as unintentional disclosure of sensitive data. For instance, a Shodan search con-
ducted by Trend Micro in 2017 found more than 83,000 industry robots exposed
on the Internet, whereas more than 5,000 of these had no authentication whatso-
ever [20]. These robots were operating in sectors such as automotive, aerospace,
defence, food and beverages. Similarly, the increased connectivity and lack of se-
curity awareness in the shipping industry are making stakeholders worried that
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this will become the “the next playground for hackers” [42]. A common trait
to all of these industries, is that there are already well-established practices for
managing safety concerns. If these practices can be extended to also encompass
security, we might have an easier path than introducing a set of security analysis
techniques that are unfamiliar to them and must be done in parallel.
Security models provide a useful basis for security analysis and requirements
elicitation, e.g. supporting comparative evaluations of threats and intended secu-
rity properties [3]. Security modelling comes in many different forms and flavours
[4], and there is not necessarily one single best or correct way of performing it
[34]. In many practical situations, this is a choice depending on factors such as
available resources, focus area, domain, level of abstraction and personal prefer-
ences, but there is currently little empirical knowledge that can guide us when
making these trade-offs. Just as with a number of other phenomena within soft-
ware engineering disciplines, there are many techniques and methods that are
used because “conventional wisdom” suggests that they are the best approaches.
As a remedy to this, experiments can investigate the situations in which the
claims are true [26]. According to Tichy [39], “experimentation can accelerate
progress by quickly eliminating fruitless approaches, erroneous assumptions, and
fads. It also helps orient engineering and theory into promising directions”.
The purpose of this paper is to present the result of an experiment related to
bow-tie analysis applied for cybersecurity. Bow-tie analysis has a long tradition
from the safety and reliability domain, where identified preventive and reactive
barriers are used as sources for eliciting requirements. We wanted to explore how
well the same analysis technique performs in the context of security, and com-
plements to existing security modelling techniques, such as misuse case diagrams
[36]. The research hypothesis central to this work is that the bow-tie notation
has a suitable expressiveness for security as well as safety. There already exists
evidence that bow-tie analysis performs well for safety considerations, but if the
hypothesis is falsified, then applying bow-tie analysis in assessment where we
need to consider both safety and security in combination would make no sense.
This paper is structured as follows. We briefly show related work and explain
the history and notation of bow-ties in Section 2. The same section also show
how bow-tie diagrams compares with misuse case diagrams. In Section 3, we
explain our research method and the details of the experiment at hand. This is
followed by a summary of results in Section 4. These results are then interpreted
and discussed as a part of Section 5, and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Models covering safety and security
There are many examples in the literature of models that allow combinations of
safety and security considerations. For instance Johnson [11] shows how to build
cybersecurity assurance cases for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
using Boolean Driven Markov Processes (BDMP), extending conventional fault
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trees. Winther et al. [41] include security as part of HAZOP studies, which is
a systematic analysis on how deviations from the design specifications in a sys-
tem can arise, and whether these deviations can result in hazards. Raspotnig et
al. [28] make use of UML-based models within a combined safety and security
assessment process to elicitate requirements. Kumar and Stoelinga [16] combine
fault and attack trees so that both safety and security can be considered in combi-
nation. Fishbone diagrams are similar to bow-ties, and are mentioned in Nolan’s
book on safety and security reviews for the process industries [25], but examples
here only focus on safety incidents. FMVEA (Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and
Effect Analysis) [32] is safety and security co-analysis method extended from
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis), which is a safety analysis method.
Like FMEA, FMVEA proposes to use the STRIDE model [35] to identify threat
modes first, and then analyze the effect each threat mode. Further examples of
methods, models, tools and techniques in the intersection of safety and secu-
rity can be found in the surveys by Zalewski et al. [43], Pie`tre-Cambace´de`s and
Bouissou [27], Chockalingam et al. [7], as well as Kriaa et al. [15].
2.2 Bow-tie history
Bow-tie analysis has since the 1970s been used by organisations world-wide for
risk management purposes, but primarily to demonstrate control over health,
safety and environmental (HSE) hazards [17]. For instance, Khakzad et al. show
this application in safety risk analysis in offshore drilling [12], Trbojevic and
Carr [40], as well as Mokhtari et al. [23], do the same for safety assessment in
international maritime ports, and Lu et al. [19] apply bow-ties in the context of
leakage from natural gas pipelines.
In our modern cybersecurity world, we have to consider the intertwined re-
lationship between safety and security during risk assessment, and make sure
that requirements can be traced back to a source, such as a barrier. As already
described by Bernsmed et al. [4], there have been several efforts at adopting the
bow-tie notation for cybersecurity within areas such as engineering environments
and maritime operations. This is because these areas are already familiar with
the notation from safety assessments, and therefore it is assumed to be easier
obtaining community buy-in by evaluating cybersecurity threats in the same
way as accident scenarios. However, we are not aware of any empirical evidence
from the literature proving that bow-ties are suitable to cover security concepts
in addition to safety.
2.3 The Bow-tie modelling notation
A central part of bow-tie analysis is the creation of graphical bow-tie diagrams.
A bow-tie diagram is something that resembles a fault-tree on the left hand side
with an event-tree on the right [17]. Figure 1 gives an overview of the modelling
elements that have been included in our experiment, based on [4]. First of all,
the Hazard element represents the riskful environment in which one or several
Unwanted events (aka. top event) can occur, but which is also necessary to
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perform business. Note that we only model one top event per diagram. A threat
is anything that can potentially cause an unwanted event [1], and there can be
several types of such threats in a single diagram. To prevent or eliminate threats,
we can add barriers (aka. controls) that interfere between threats and the top
event. An Escalation factor is a specific type of threat that targets a barrier,
opening up for the original threat.
A top event can result in one or several consequences. As with threats, we
can add controls/barriers that can reduce the probability or eliminate the con-
sequences, but these are now of a reactive nature since the top event has already
occurred.
Finally, and specifically added for security, an asset is anything tangible or
intangible with value and should be protected. We allow one or more assets to
be modelled per diagram.
Fig. 1. The basic elements of the bow-tie notation with security extension.
2.4 Bow-tie and misuse case modelling
Misuse case modelling is a well-known technique for graphical security modelling,
and can be summarized as an extension to regular UML use cases [10], adding
misuse activities, which can be considered as threats, and mis-actors, who are
malicious threat agents instantiating the misuse activities [36]. Misuse cases have
been proven useful in different industrial cases when considering security [22] and
eliciting requirements [36], and are therefore a good basis for comparison with
bow-tie diagrams. Table 1 gives an overview of the main properties of both
misuse case and bow-tie diagrams. Based on this comparison, we would argue
that misuse case and bow-tie diagrams are more complementary than competing
types of security models, something we have exploited in our experiment.
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Table 1. A comparison of misuse case and bow-tie diagrams.
Misuse case diagrams Bow-tie diagrams
[Both] Defined by a simple to understand graphical notation with an open-ended
method, allowing for a lot of creativity to the modeller.
Originate from computer security and re-
quirements engineering, based on UML use
case diagrams.
Originate from the safety & reliability do-
main, related to fault analysis.
Developed to identify malicious actions
(misuse) for a given scenario.
Developed to investigate accident scenarios
and define barriers.
The misuse activity element represents an
unwanted event (something that threatens
regular activities).
The top event element represents an un-
wanted event.
Suitable for describing many different mis-
use activities in a single diagram.
Focus on a single unwanted top event per
diagram.
Show actors (threat agents) related to mis-
use activities.
Do not represent actors, but in which risk-
ful environment (hazard) the top event can
occur.
Mitigations are modelled as security activ-
ities.
Mitigations are modelled as barriers, which
are clearly defined as either preventive or
reactive.
Can depict vulnerabilities that a misuse ac-
tivity can exploit.
Represent threats/causes that can lead to
the top event.
Consequences are not part of the diagram. Explicitly depict possible consequences fol-
lowing the top event.
3 Experiment method
In order to plan our experiment, we adopted and applied the guidelines by
Kitchenham et al. [13], originally designed for empirical studies in software en-
gineering. The form of the study is a controlled experiment, which is a scientific
method for identifying cause-effect relationships [37], and as a means to “ac-
quire general knowledge about which technology (process, method, technique,
language or tool) is useful for whom to conduct which tasks in which environ-
ments”. The intervention we introduce is the use of the bow-tie notation for
security analysis on two sample population that are both working on the same
case. Since there are no random assignments, this should be classified as a quasi-
experiment, and as a formal experiment since we have a high level of control over
the variables that can affect the truth of the hypothesis [26].
One of the sample populations consists of students, and therefore it has been
important to make sure that they perceive a value from participation [5]. By
carefully scoping the case of the experiment and having an approach that is new
to the student sample and professionals in general, we expect to get relevant
results with external validity [31]. The case in focus and experiment setup is
described in the sections below.
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3.1 Case: Digital exams
The security modelling assignment we chose is the use of digital exams, some-
thing that is rapidly growing in popularity at Universities and other educational
institutions. Here, exams are created, solved and graded using online systems.
This is meant to be more efficient than traditional exams done on paper, how-
ever, relies on technology and opens up to new types of threats that need to be
identified and dealt with. For instance, a survey by Chen and We [6] shows that
there is a great diversity of security risks for online exams, nevertheless, security
is not considered as a top priority among learning providers and practitioners.
Additionally, there is evidence that both digital and “analogue” exams suffer
due to new technical ways of cheating. According to the Guardian [21], there
has been a 42% rise in cheating cases between 2012 and 2016 involving gadgets
such as mini cameras and micro earbuds. London [18] gives an overview of fur-
ther inventive and not-so-inventive ways that have been used for cheating on
online exams. All in all, a case related to digital exams provides an interesting
and relevant arena for looking at security issues and possible solutions.
In our case, there are many of students participating in the exam in the
same confined room and within the same time frame. This is a bit different to
other types of digital exams, which can be done from home and at any given
time. Furthermore, the students are allowed to use their own personal comput-
ers with internet access through WiFi, but are not allowed to use supporting
materials, such as curriculum books and notes. A specific Web browser must be
installed on their computers, known as the Safe Exam Browser3 (SEB), which
regulates access to websites, search engines, other applications and system calls,
also referred to as browser lockdown.
3.2 Experiment setup
Our experiment engaged two types of populations as a basis for comparison; a
small sample of security experts and larger sample of computer science MSc grad-
uate students. The characteristics of these groups can be described as follows.
The students participated in the experiment as a part of a classroom exercise
in a course on secure software engineering, and were motivated to learn security
modelling in order to apply such techniques for their exercises and final exam.
Before the experiment, the students had taken several lectures including security
concepts and principles, OWASP top 10, crypto introduction, multilevel secu-
rity and multilateral security. The students had limited knowledge of security
modelling on beforehand and no experience at all from bow-tie modelling. More-
over, the students had significant practical experience related to digital exams
as they had already been exposed to this on several occasions. It is unknown
how experienced and reflected they were related to cheating.
The security experts had a great deal of prior knowledge and practical ex-
perience in various types of security modelling, and in particular bow-tie for
3 This is an open source tool available and further documented at
https://www.safeexambrowser.org/.
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specific domains. In contrast to the students, the experts had limited practical
experience of participation in digital exams, though one of them was skilled with
setting up exams using the online system. The experts were motivated by the
research itself, and the desire to create a good reference model that the student
results could be compared to.
As an introduction, the students were given a lecture on threat modelling,
including the misuse case and bow-tie notations. As we know from prior ex-
periences, one of the challenges of bow-tie diagrams is setting the scope of the
unwanted event. Therefore, the students were presented with a misuse case model
that we hoped would better define the scope and the relationship between the
events. This model is shown in Figure 2, and depicts a number of actors and
typical activities related to digital exams, as well as misuse case activities and
associated threat actors. For example, the actor professor will need to log in
to the system and create exam assignments prior to the examination day. An
external attacker actor would possibly want to steal assignments and maybe
sell this online to students that want to cheat. After the examination day, an
additional external examiner is involved in the process of grading exams. The
attacker could at this point in time try to change the results of the exam. Dur-
ing the examination day itself, the main legitimate actor is the student that
needs to setup his/her computer, which also involves sub-activities such as con-
necting to the network and installing the correct SEB software. In order to do
the exam, the student must authenticate by logging in, enter the exam pin for
this particular exam, solve the assignments and finally submit the exam. On the
right side of the diagram, we have depicted a bad student actor that inherits
all the activities from the legitimate student actor. With the misuse case nota-
tion, it is common to use a grey shading for such malicious “insiders” [29]. The
bad student has a misuse activity mostly relevant prior to the examination day,
which is to buy the assignments in advance, and two others that threaten the
regular activities during the exam. The first one, disrupt exam, is basically a
way of sabotaging the examination for everyone, possibly motivated by a wish
of cancelling/delaying the exam. The second one is cheat during exam, which a
student would do to illegitimately improve his/her grade. The proctor is a type
of examination guard that supervises the exam and is there to mitigate cheating
attempts and disruptions.
The next step of the introduction was to show how a misuse activity can
be detailed as bow-tie top event. This was demonstrated with disrupt exam as
shown in Figure 3. In this model, there are a number of threats that can lead to
a disruption, such as tampering with the fuse box to cause power outage, jam-
ming the wireless network or performing some other action to make the online
server unavailable. The assets that needs to be protected are the network, the
SEB software and the physical premises themselves. We added some example
preventive controls/barriers, such as locking the fuse box cabinet and having a
system mirror site on hot standby. In terms of disruption consequences, com-
puters can stop working and the bad student can be expelled. The only reactive
control/barrier shown here is switching to paper in order to complete the exam.
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Having introduced the notation, defined the scope and given examples, the
populations were now ready to work on their own diagrams. We predefined digital
exam as the riskful environment, cheat during exam as the top event and the
asset answers as a starting point. Both populations worked on this same case,
with access to external information such as SEB documentation and articles
about online exams and cheating. The students worked in teams, typically 2-3
persons per model, spending about 30 minutes on their task, and were observed
by two of the authors of this paper. The experts worked independently of each
other for about one hour. Both populations used an online modelling tool4 to
create their models. The tool itself has an intuitive drag-and-drop interface for
the basic bow-tie elements, and runs within any web browser. A screenshot of
this tool is shown in Figure 4.
The students were informed that all participation was anonymous and vol-
untarily, and that we wanted to make use of the result to evaluate the bow-tie
notation for security.
4 Freely available at https://github.com/KDPRO-SINTEF/BowtieTool
An experimental evaluation of bow-tie analysis... 9
Fig. 2. Defining the scope with a misuse case diagram.
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Fig. 3. Example model showed as a preparation.
Fig. 4. The online tool used for making the bow-tie diagrams.
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4 Results
4.1 Models made by students
A total of 40 students were present in the experiment session, which resulted in 13
different models. Observations from the classroom indicated that approximately
30 students contributed to these models. This estimate is based on the average
size of the groups and that we also know that not all models were submitted
(this was voluntarily). The models were then analysed, and we created a small
taxonomy of threats, controls/barriers and consequences in order to be able to
compare them. Based on this, we developed a combined bow-tie diagram, shown
in Figure 5 in Appendix A, which also indicates the frequency of the threat and
consequence elements found in the models made by the students. As can be seen
from the figure, the top threats were:
– Analogue cheat sheet, the most popular threat, appeared in 6 out of the 13
models that we collected (6/13). This is probably the most “traditional” way
of cheating, and involves smuggling in and making use of some written mate-
rial, e.g. paper notes hidden inside the wrapper of a candy bar or somewhere
on the body of the student.
– Access external information (4/13) encompasses using the computer to search
and access information on the Internet.
– Another person takes exam (4/13) is related to impersonation and not some-
thing that is unique to digital exams.
– Digital chat with others (3/13) is when the student computer is used to
communicate with others in the same room or on the outside.
– Hack browser (3/13) is done by somehow modifying the source code or ex-
ploiting an existing vulnerability in the SEB software to disable the lockdown
functionality.
– Run browser in virtual machine (3/13) was represented as a threat in two of
the models, and as an escalation factor in a third. In the combined model,
we represent it as an escalation factor since this is basically a way of cir-
cumventing a preventive barrier by letting the SEB software lockdown the
virtual machine instead of the computer itself.
– Digital communication with others (3/13) covers all kinds of gadgets besides
the student computer that are used for communication with others. This
typically includes bluetooth devices and other radio equipment.
– Spy on other screens (3/13), also denoted as “shoulder surfing”, is simply
ways of looking at other people’s answers without them noticing it.
Some additional threats can be found in Figure 5, but these were only present
in one or two of the models. Additionally, we discarded three threats that were
out of scope for this top event, namely Retrieve exam answers beforehand, Dis-
rupt exam and Blackmail professor.
On the consequence side of the diagram, Cheater gets good results (7/13)
was most prevalent, followed by Cheater expelled (6/13) and Bad publicity (for
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the University). It is interesting to see that these are consequences for both
successful cheating as well as consequences for the cheater if he/she gets caught.
The combined model does not show the frequency of barriers/controls be-
cause a lot of them overlap over more than one threat/consequence. We also
noticed that some of the models (4/13) contained additional assets, so we added
these to the combined model as well.
4.2 Models made by security experts
There were three security experts participating in this experiment, resulting in
three independent bow-tie models. These were analysed in the same manner as
the student models and aligned using the same taxonomy. The resulting com-
bined model from the experts is shown in Figure 6 in Appendix A. There were
only four threats that had an overlap between the expert models; Access exter-
nal information, Another person takes exam, Hack browser and Phone outsiders.
The three former were all present among the top threats from the student mod-
els as well, while the latter was not. We discarded one threat from the model,
Introduce vulnerability in SEB OSS project, since this is something that must be
done prior to the exam and hence out of scope for this top event. The expert and
student models shared their top consequence, namely Cheater gets good result.
Besides from that one, there was little overlap between consequences among the
experts. Note that there are several threats and consequences that are without
any barriers. It turned out that one of the experts forgot about adding these,
and therefore spend more time on finding threats and consequences compared
to the others.
Table 2 shows a numerical comparison of the models created by the two
populations. The last row shows how many distinct elements that are common
between the combined models from each population. Since the level of detail vary,
it was not possible to always create direct mappings. Therefore, Communicate via
WiFi and Communication using bluetooth device in the expert model is mapped
to the single threat Digital communication with others in the student model.
Likewise, the preventive barrier Strong authentication in the expert model maps
towards the less strict Authentication in the student model.
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Table 2. A numerical summary of model elements
Measurement Experts Students
Number of participants 3 ∼ 30
Number of models 3 13
Total number of threats 18 49
Number of distinct threats 12 14
Average number of threats per model 6 3.8
Total number of consequences 10 27
Number of distinct consequences 8 9
Average number of consequences per model 3.3 2.1
Total number of preventive barriers 16 41
Number of distinct preventive barriers 10 9
Average number of preventive barriers per model 5.3 3.2
Total number of reactive barriers 6 6
Number of distinct reactive barriers 4 3
Average number of reactive barriers per model 2 0.5
Common threats/consequences/{preventive/reactive}
barriers
7 / 5 / 3 / 0
5 Discussion
5.1 Interpretation of results
It was interesting to see how well the students were able to grasp the concepts
of bow-tie modelling and apply it to the digital exam case after just a relatively
short introduction. There are a few notable differences when comparing results
from students with experts, such that the average numbers of threats, preventive
barriers and consequences per model are all about 60% higher for the experts.
This is to be expected, since the experts had a deeper security knowledge and
did also have some additional time for developing their models. The number of
reactive barriers was clearly higher for the experts, but this is in line with a gen-
eral observation that the students tended to focus on the left side of the diagram.
In fact, 3 of the 13 models from the students had no elements on the right side
whatsoever. Another significant difference was that two of the experts modelled
two or three barriers for most of their threats, while this was not observed in
any of the student models where all threats had just a single control/barrier.
This can be interpreted in two ways; the students did not fully understand that
the tool supported adding more than one barrier per threat, or the students did
not think that it is necessary to implement more than one barrier per threat in
a real system. The last experts did, as mentioned above, not model any barriers,
and this skews the average barrier per threat significantly. Identifying a wide
range of barriers is considered to be one of the primary advantages of bow-tie
modelling, and we have made a note to encourage this a bit more in later work.
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When we consider the students as a collaborative group, the numbers of the
distinct threats, consequences and both types of barriers are almost identical to
what the experts produced. When we look beyond these numbers and compare
the type of elements in the taxonomy, there is a clear tendency for the experts to
focus on technical threats and threats that are specific for digital exams, while
the students have included more of the traditional ways of cheating. We believe
that both of these inputs can be important, and advocate for a combination
of security experts and end-users (in our case, the students) when developing
these kinds of security models, and consequently defining requirement based on
barriers.
Our general impression is that the students showed great creativity, covering
most of the same threats and consequences as the experts identified, and discov-
ering additional ones as well. The bow-tie notation did not seem like an obstacle
for expressing this, which confirms our hypothesis that the bow-tie notation has
a suitable expressiveness for security as well as safety issues. The students also
identified additional elements on the consequence side that the experts had not
thought of, even though it seems like the students spent most of their time on
the threat side. The students seemed just as good as the experts at staying inside
the scope of the top event, something we believe can be attributed to the misuse
case presentation in the introduction of the experiment.
5.2 Limitations and threat to validity
There are several factors to consider regarding the validity of this experiment.
Convenience sampling is a threat to a lot of experiments that involve a popula-
tion consisting of students, as this can come at the cost of low external validity,
but we argue that our sample already had taken an interest in security and repre-
sent an aspiring group of people that are likely to work with security engineering
in their professional careers. According to a survey on controlled software engi-
neering experiments by Falessi et al. [8], there are pros and cons with both the
use of professionals and students, and it is impossible to state that one is always
better than the other. Studies by Salman et al. [31], Svahnberg et al. [38] and
Ho¨st et al. [9] show that there is little difference in performance between these
groups, especially for graduate students [30].
Though the participation was voluntarily and anonymously, the students
seemed motivated and we did not see any submitted models with frivolous con-
tent. Furthermore, it was in their own interest to get some relevant experience
in security modelling for their course exercises and final exam.
The time that the students had available for the analysis and modelling was
very limited. In real life, a thorough analysis would include defining a series
of top events within the same riskful environment, and there would be several
iterations on each model to improve their coverage and quality. We have tried to
address this by letting the students collaborate directly, and by spending time in
the introduction on defining a narrow scope for a single top event. Alternatively,
we could also have given different top events to different groups and thus have a
wider analysis, but that would impose limitations to the comparison afterwards.
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Another limiting factor of this study is that we did not perform any system-
atic user evaluation. Our evidence is thus solely based on the resulting models,
aided by observations and comments received during the experiment. For future
work, this can be done in several ways, e.g. with standardised usability surveys
or adopt from the Information Systems (IS) field Moody’s Method Evaluation
Model [24] that combines measurable constructs such as effectiveness, perceived
usefulness and ease of use, intention to use and actual usage. Another approach
could also be to engage participants in interacting focus groups where they more
freely discuss their opinions.
In our previous work [4], we have more informally evaluated situations that
combine safety and security within the same bow-tie models. Though this would
have been desirable to try out in this experiment as well, we chose to focus on
security issues as we could not find a suitable case where the student would have
enough domain knowledge to consider safety, in addition to security.
5.3 Further research directions
Both misuse case models and bow-tie diagrams are high-level modelling tech-
niques, and are in their basic forms not concerned about attack sequences, re-
lationships between threats, or attributes such as costs and likelihood. Attack(-
Defense) trees [33, 14] can for instance be used to further drill down the details
of how the unwanted event/attacker goal can be realised, but there is a need
to obtain more practical knowledge about what level of granularity and level
of detail to represent with various security modelling techniques, and when we
should switch between them.
In this experiment, the students and experts did not attempt to transform
the barriers into well-defined security requirements. In addition, prioritisation
would be the next step of this process, but that would require quantification of
risk and mitigation costs. Both of these steps are natural continuations that we
would like to follow up.
The bow-tie modelling tool itself was not something we set out to evaluate
as a part of this study, but observations and comments suggest that the built-
in support for creating and connecting the right elements together was helpful
indeed. In our study, the collaborating students were sitting closely together
using the same computer, but it would be interesting to see how well such a
web-based tool can facilitate online collaboration. The tool has already built-in
functionality for sharing models between users, as well as getting a quick start
by importing templates made by others. During the analysis, it also occurred
to us that an online voting mechanism could help create consensus about which
threats, consequences and associated barriers should be prioritised.
6 Conclusion
Our research hypothesis has been that the bow-tie notation has a suitable ex-
pressiveness for security as well as safety, and our controlled experiment goes a
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long way in verifying this. One of the main strengths of bow-tie analysis is the
identification of preventive and reactive barriers, which can be used as traceable
sources for the following requirements elicitation process. Na¨ıve professionals
might have a tendency to focus on preventive barriers, leading to requirements
for risk mitigation or avoidance, while experienced professionals seem to balance
this more with reactive barriers and requirements for incident management.
Our results are useful in areas where we need to evaluate safety and security
concerns together, especially for domains that have experience in HSE hazards,
but now needs to expand this with cybersecurity as well. Of course, there should
be further studies on a wider range of situations before this can be generalized
across domains. The experiment results also advocate for a combination of people
involved when creating security models. Our observations show that the security
experts were better at finding technical threats and alternative barriers, while the
combined mass of students found a wider range of threats (i.e. ways of cheating)
and consequences that would affect individuals such as themselves.
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A Combined bow-tie diagrams
Fig. 5. A combination of the models made by the students.
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Fig. 6. A combination of the models made by the experts.
